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I. INTRODUCTION

On numerous websites users can find 3D printable items bearing
unauthorized trademarks owned by others. Among the countless
available items are phone cases,1 key chains, 2 action figures, 3 and
models of vehicles and spaceships 4 from movies.

* Visiting Associate Professor, University of Denver Law School, Associate Professor, Campbell
University School of Law. The author would like to thank Bernard Chao, Kristelia Garcia, Deborah
Gerhardt, Viva Moffat, and Harry Surden for their helpful comments. Thanks are also in order for
the faculty of the University of Akron School of Law for hosting a wonderful event.
1. Iphone Case, THINGIVERSE (June 4, 2015), http://www.thingiverse.com/thing:864824.
2. Apple Logo and Keychain, THINGIVERSE (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.thingiverse.com/
thing:595565.
3. A Darth Vader from Star Wars can be found here: Low Poly Darth Vader, YOUMAGINE,
https://www.youmagine.com/designs/low-poly-darth-vader (last visited Nov. 30, 2016).
4. Millenium Falcon, THINGIVERSE (June 3, 2016), http://www.thingiverse.com/
thing:1598269.
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All fun and games with cute toys, right? Probably not—at least not to the
rights holders of the intellectual property (IP) depicted in the objects.
Indeed, under the Lanham Act, rights holders have sued to enjoin sellers
of physical objects like phone cases containing their trademarks 5 and toy
versions of cars depicted in TV shows. 6 Under current trademark law,
the sale of a physical item that, without authorization, bears another’s
trademark is generally an act of infringement. 7 But as more commerce
moves into the realm of digital bits, laws built around a world of atoms
will be challenged. Issues are likely to proliferate as 3D printing
continues to mature and methods of printing in an increasing variety of
materials become possible. People can already print shoes,8 handbags
and accessories, 9 magnets, 10 tools, 11 circuits, 12 and even buildings. 13
5. Some Chanel Phone Case Covers are Oh So Faux, A PREPONDERANCE OF FASHION
(Mar. 2015), http://www.apreponderanceoffashion.com/fashion-law/chanel-sues-chanel-phonecase-copycats/. Chanel, Inc. v. Shop Jeen, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-09861 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 15, 2014)
(case resolved through settlement); Shop Jeen Settled Suit with Chanel, is Flattered to Have Been
Sued, THE FASHION LAW (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/shop-jeen-settledsuit-with-chanel-is-flattered-to-have-been-sued.
6. See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981) (granting Lanham
Act protection to the “General Lee” car as depicted in “The Dukes of Hazzard” TV show and
indicating defendant’s toy version of the car would generate confusion as to manufacture or
sponsorship).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2016).
8. Our Story, FEETZ, http://feetz.com/story (last visited Feb. 7, 2016) (describing a 3D
printing shoe store); The Future of Running is Here, NEW BALANCE (Apr. 15, 2016),
https://www.newbalance.com/article?id=4041 (describing a shoe with a 3D printed insole).
9. 3D Printing Purses, Belts and Other Pliable Fashion Accessories, INSTRUCTABLES,
http://www.instructables.com/id/3D-Printing-Purses-Belts-and-other-Pliable-Fashio/ (last visited
Feb. 7, 2017) (describing 3D printed purse and accessories printed in pliable nylon); Bridget Butler
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Trademark-based lawsuits will undoubtedly multiply.
3D printing (also called additive manufacturing) technology will
complicate these lawsuits, so it is imperative that courts understand the
technology. Anything that can be 3D printed must first be created in a
digital file that instructs the printer what to do.14 As with digital music
files, users can copy and share 3D printing files with ease. When these
digital files (sometimes referred to generically as CAD files) contain
depictions of trademark- or trade dress-bearing goods, trademark owners
will likely want to control the dissemination of such files. 15
Many courts today would be tempted to find that the seller of the
digital file depicted above committed trademark infringement. Such a
finding of infringement would be based on a property-centric view of
trademark law that is divorced from traditional trademark policies
focusing on consumer confusion and from more limited property
perspectives that dominated before the mid-twentieth century. But 3D
printing technology alters settled assumptions about manufacturing,
design, and trademarks and thus precludes simplistic application of
current trademark doctrine. 16 An understanding of the technology and its

Millsaps, Mixee Labs Produces Sleek, Sophisticated 3D Printed Line of Purses and Wallets (Jan.
11, 2015), https://3dprint.com/36409/mixee-labs-3d-printed-purses/ (describing handbags printed in
with interlocking plastic pieces).
10. C. Huber, et al., 3D Print of Polymer Bonded Rare-Earth Magnets, and 3D Magnetic
Field Scanning With an End-User 3D Printer, 109 APPL’D PHYSICS LETTERS 162401 (2016);
Revolutionary 3D Printed Magnets by Polymagnet, 3D-ERS (Mar. 24, 2016),
http://www.3ders.org/articles/20160324-revolutionary-3d-printed-magnets-by-correlatedmagnetics-can-change-engineering.html.
11. Space Station 3-D Printer Builds Ratchet Wrench To Complete First Phase Of
Operations,
NASA
(Dec.
22,
2014),
https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/
research/news/3Dratchet_wrench.
12. Simon Fried, When 3D Printing Meets PCBs, EE TIMES (Apr. 20, 2016),
http://www.eetimes.com/author.asp?section_id=36&doc_id=1329449.
13. Michelle Starr, Dubai Unveils World’s First 3D-Printed Office Building, CNET (Mar.
25,
2016),
https://www.cnet.com/news/dubai-unveils-worlds-first-3d-printed-office-building/;
Michelle Starr, World’s First 3D-Printed Apartment Building Constructed in China, CNET (Jan.
19, 2015), https://www.cnet.com/news/worlds-first-3d-printed-apartment-building-constructed-inchina/.
14. Lucas S. Osborn, Regulating Three-Dimensional Printing: The Converging Worlds of
Bits and Atoms, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 553, 559-60 (2014). For a more in-depth description of 3D
printing, see id at 558-62.
15. See, e.g., Press Release, Gartner Says Uses of 3D Printing Will Ignite Major Debate on
Ethics and Regulation, GARTNER (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2658315
(“The rapid emergence of this technology will also create major challenges in relation to intellectual
property (IP) theft. Gartner predicts that by 2018, 3D printing will result in the loss of at least $100
billion per year in IP globally.”).
16. See Harry Surden, Technological Cost as Law in Intellectual Property, 27 HARV. J. L. &
TECH. 135 (2013) (describing how changes in technology releases implicit constraints on IP law and

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017

3

Akron Law Review, Vol. 50 [2017], Iss. 4, Art. 6

868

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[50:865

potential favors trademark laws that support free competition and
technologically-enabled growth.
3D printing technology divides the processes of design and
manufacturing. In doing so, it demystifies trademarks, 17 especially as
symbols of source. Manufacturing, which can be accomplished by
anyone with access to the appropriate 3D printer, is commoditized and
democratized. Product design is also democratized—it can be
meaningfully accomplished by individuals using widely available
software. Incentivizing quality manufacturing by brand owners becomes
less important where manufacturing is in the hands of consumers. 18
Further, where brand owners are merely designers and not
manufacturers, other IP regimes, including design patents, utility patents,
and copyrights, exert primacy. 19 Finally, for individuals who have wide
access to files and manufacturing capability, trademarks increasingly
connote the personal expression of the user more so than manufacturing
source or affiliation. 20
At a more granular level, how people exchange 3D printing files
introduces fundamental questions about the source and affiliation
indications of trademarks. Given the context in which purchasers
encounter 3D printable files, including website addresses, usernames
associated with file creators, and even disclaimers, they are unlikely to
understand trademarks appearing in the digital file as source,
sponsorship, or affiliation designations. 21 Instead, these marks provide
an understood level of digital verisimilitude.
Further, because the file sold is not used by the purchaser in public,
post-sale confusion is generally inapplicable to the file. Commentators
thus far have been unaware of this significant doctrinal challenge posed
by 3D printing technology. 22 The purchaser may print and then use the
printed (physical) item in public, but that use cannot constitute post-sale
confusion because the physical item is distinct from the file sold. The
seller of the file is only liable, if at all, under an indirect infringement
theory. 23
On the other hand, given the ease with which people can create and
exchange design files, trademark law simultaneously becomes more
can catalyze doctrinal changes to the law).
17. Throughout this Article I will generally refer to trademarks as including trade dress.
18. See infra Section III.B.
19. Id.
20. See infra Section III.C.
21. See infra Section III.A.
22. See id.
23. Id.
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important in a digital world. There will be contexts in which the selling
of digital files should result in trademark infringement. The flood of
design files increases the need for symbols to reduce search costs. But
the symbols should be those source indicators that are actually material
to consumers, such as the user name of the file creator or the website on
which the file is available, rather than symbols appearing “inside” the
digital file.
Following this introduction, Part II situates current trademark
doctrine in terms of its dramatic growth over the twentieth century and
the Supreme Court’s quick succession of cases from 2000 to 2003 that
pared back some of that growth. The analysis demonstrates the Court’s
intense concern for proper boundaries in trademark and other IP law and
for the maintenance of zones of competition uninhibited by IP claims.
Part III harnesses the holdings and themes of those Supreme Court
cases to dissect how trademark law doctrine and policy apply to 3D
printing files. As previewed above, the analysis provides surprising
results and demonstrates how 3D printing and other digital technology
raise fundamental policy questions concerning the meaning and scope of
source, sponsorship, and affiliation indication and, more broadly,
trademark law’s role in a digital environment. In some ways trademark
law may be more important, but in other ways less so. The analysis has
implications not only for 3D printing files, but also for digital files
generally.
II. TRADEMARK BOUNDARIES AND BENEFICIAL COPYING
For centuries merchants applied marks to physical goods to indicate
a source of manufacturing. 24 Over time, the law has come to recognize
that trademark law serves two primary and interrelated functions.25 First,
it protects manufacturers’ incentives to invest in quality goods by
preventing an imitator from adopting the same mark and thus diverting
sales from the first manufacturer. 26 Second, trademark law protects
24. Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP.
265, 273-80 (1975); Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1849-50 (2013) [hereinafter McKenna, Normative Foundations]. People have
used marks for thousands of years to indicate ownership, such as branding cattle. See, e.g.,
Diamond, supra note 24, at 265-72.
25. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:2
(4th ed. 2013) (discussing the dual goals of trademark law to “protect both consumers from
deception and confusion over trade symbols and to protect the plaintiff’s infringed trademark as
property”).
26. Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) (“[T]rademarks
foster . . . the maintenance of quality by securing to the producer the benefits of good reputation.”);
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consumers from deception by allowing a trademark to connote a specific
(if anonymous) source, thus enhancing information quality on which
consumers rely. 27 In simple trademark infringement cases, the law
simultaneously protects both the manufacturers’ and the consumers’
interests. For example, suppose I buy shoes bearing an Adidas logo
because I believe the company that owns that trademark makes the
shoes, and I have come over time to equate those shoes with good
quality. If in fact the shoes I purchased are cheap counterfeits and I did
not know it, I have been deceived into buying a cheap product. Further, I
lose the ability to rely on the Adidas mark as a shortcut for preference.
Finally, the true company that stands behind Adidas shoes is harmed
because it lost a sale.
To understand the doctrinal challenges of 3D printable files and
trademark law, it is necessary to understand the recent expansions and
contractions in trademark law. Situating 3D printable files within this
narrative illuminates the modern understanding of trademark law’s
normative goals and how digital files interact with them.
The story of modern trademark law has mostly been one of
expansion. 28 Because this expansion is well-covered, I outline briefly
only the expansions most relevant to 3D printing technology. A century
ago, trademark infringement only occurred where goods competed
directly with each other. 29 As commerce grew more complex and brand
owners licensed others to manufacture goods on their behalf, courts
allowed trademark law to expand. By the early twentieth century, a few
courts expanded trademark rights into related, but not directly competing
goods. 30
see also McKenna, Normative Foundations, supra note 24, at 1850-63 (discussing the historical
trade-diversion focus of English and American trademark law).
27. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 166-68 (2003); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48
EMORY L.J. 367, 417 (1999).
28. See, e.g., Deborah R. Gerhardt, Consumer Investment in Trademark, 88 N.C. L. REV.
427, 437-42 (2010); McKenna, Normative Foundations, supra note 24, at 1896 (“Courts, with some
help from Congress, significantly broadened trademark law during the twentieth century.”); Mark
A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1706–
07 (1999); Lunney, supra note 27.
29. See JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS, TRADENAMES, AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 4, at 15 (3d ed. 1917) (quoting DUNCAN M. KERLY, THE LAW OF TRADE-MARKS,
TRADE-NAME, AND MERCHANDISE MARKS 475 (2d ed. 1901)) (“The qualified right in the
tradename [or a trademark], a right to prevent a defendant from passing off his goods as those of the
plaintiff by the use of it—exists only with regard to goods of the kind for which the plaintiff uses it,
and to which the connection with his business suggested by the use of the name extends.”).
30. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REV.
137, 146-47 (2010) [hereinafter Lemley & McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s].
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In the latter part of the twentieth century, courts expanded the law
further and protected mark owners from uses of their marks on unrelated
goods if the use would cause consumer confusion as to affiliation or
sponsorship. 31 Thus, for example, if I make baseball hats with my
university’s trademarked logo, I can be guilty of trademark infringement
regardless whether the university sells hats with its logo; merely the
chance of “sponsorship confusion” prevents such uses. As has been
observed, affiliation and sponsorship confusion have a circular
component to them: one is more likely confused as to sponsorship or
affiliation if the law protects such rights and conditions the public to
expect them. 32 Thus, sponsorship and affiliation confusion have the
innate ability to self-perpetuate and metastasize.
As a final example of trademark law expansion (to say nothing of
dilution 33), courts have found trademark infringement in cases where the
purchaser knew the goods were fake at the time of purchase. These cases
presented a conceptual problem because the law originally protected
against only confusion at the point of sale. 34 To circumvent this problem,
courts adopted the doctrine of post-sale confusion, reasoning that third
parties might be confused as to the authenticity of the item when they
see a non-deceived purchaser wearing or using it. 35 Courts apply this
doctrine without requiring proof that the allegedly confused third parties
would have ever bought the trademarked goods. 36
These various expansions can work together to expand the law even
further. For instance, a trademark owner can combine affiliation
31. See generally, Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile
Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461 (2005) (discussing the recent vintage of
merchandising claims). Congress amended the Lanham Act to acquiesce to sponsorship and
affiliation confusion. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, tit. I, sec. 132, §
43(a), 102 Stat. 3935, 3946 (1989).
32. Lunney, supra note 27.
33. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012).
34. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 27, at 469-75 (1999); Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Use
and the Problem of Source, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 773, 798-99.
35. The earliest such U.S. case is Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron &
Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1955). The Mastercrafters court also
was concerned that non-confused purchasers of the imitation clock would “acquir[e] the prestige [of
appearing to own] a prestigious article.” Id. at 466. Prototypical cases involve shoppers at flea
markets or other venues notorious for selling counterfeit goods. See, e.g., Omega SA v. 375 Canal,
LLC, No. 12 Civ. 6979(PAC), 2013 WL 2156043 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2013) (involving counterfeit
sales); Colleen Jordan Orscheln, Bad News Birkins: Counterfeit in Luxury Brands, 14 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 249, 250-51 (2015) (discussing counterfeit sales). The purchasers know the
goods are counterfeit, and thus are not confused. But when the purchaser later wears the goods in
public, others may see. If, as is often the case, the goods are of inferior quality to the genuine goods,
viewers may blame the poor quality on the owner of the brand displayed.
36. Lemley & McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, supra note 30, at 152-53.
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confusion with post-sale confusion to stop a person from selling a noncompeting good to a customer who is not confused as to affiliation or
sponsorship. 37
After virtually unabated expansion throughout the twentieth
century, 38 early in the twenty-first century the Supreme Court decided
three cases that dramatically pruned certain aspects of trademark law.39
Although none of these decisions concerned printable files, each impacts
them—at a minimum by signaling the Court’s interest in channeling
claims to proper areas of IP law and invigorating a sphere of
unencumbered competition with beneficial copying.
First, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 40 the Court
wrestled with the law of trade dress protection. Spurred on in part by the
Court’s own decisions, particularly its decision in Two Pesos that held
trade dress can be inherently distinctive,41 trade dress protection
strengthened dramatically in the 1990s. 42 Wal-Mart represents a step to
weaken trade dress protection in the troublesome area of product
design. 43 Samara sold a line of children’s clothing decorated with fruit

37. See Au-Tomotive Gold Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 603 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th
Cir. 2010); see also Lemley & McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, supra note 30, at 152-53 (discussing
the case).
38. The Court itself contributed to the expansion at times. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson
Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (interpreting the Lanham Act to allow color alone to serve as a
trademark/trade dress); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 776 (1992) (holding
that trade dress can be inherently distinctive, and if so, does not require proof of secondary
meaning); Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 205 (1985) (interpreting the
Lanham Act to mean that an infringement action based on an incontestable mark may not be
defended on the grounds that the mark is merely descriptive).
39. The Court also decided Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003), which
held that plaintiffs must show actual dilution, as opposed to a likelihood of dilution, in dilution
claims. Congress overruled the Moseley decision in the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006.
Trademark Dilution Revision Act, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006).
40. 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
41. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 776.
42. Dana Beldiman, Protecting the Form but Not the Function: Is U.S. Law Ready for a New
Model High Tech?, 20 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 529, 529 (2003) (“Pressured by systemic
demands for stronger protection mechanisms, judicial decisions have dramatically broadened the
scope of protection, in particular in the area of trade dress law.”); Gary Myers, Statutory
Interpretation, Property Rights, and Boundaries: The Nature and Limits of Protection in Trademark
Dilution, Trade Dress, and Product Configuration Cases, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 241, 243
(2000) (providing a table to show the expansion of trade dress litigation in the 1980s and 1990s and
stating that, “[l]itigation concerning the subject matter and extent of protection available for . . .
trade dress has increased considerably in recent years, particularly as trademark owners have
become aware . . . of the generous protections that the Supreme Court accorded to trade dress in
Two Pesos.”).
43. Beldiman, supra note 42, at 563 (“The Wal-Mart ruling was prompted by the Court’s
desire to stem the doctrinal expansion of the trade dress doctrine.”).
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shapes. Believing that it had (unregistered) trade dress protection in the
clothes’ designs, it sued Wal-Mart for selling “knockoffs” of the clothes.
The specific issue on appeal was whether trade dress infringement could
be found in the absence of proof of acquired distinctiveness (secondary
meaning).
To uphold its Two Pesos decision, the Wal-Mart Court
distinguished between product packaging, which it said can be
inherently distinctive, and product design, which it said cannot be.44 The
Court offered no empirical evidence to justify its rule and instead
nakedly asserted that with “product design, as in the case of color, we
think consumer predisposition to equate the feature with the source does
not exist.” 45
While others have rightly criticized the Court’s armchair consumer
psychology, the error is largely harmless in that it simply involves
defensible and familiar tradeoffs between a rule versus a standard. The
overall thrust of the Court’s opinion was to choose the efficiency of a
clear rule over the costs of a more searching standard to preserve a
sphere of competition by imitation. The Court was rather transparent
about this, stating that, “[c]ompetition is deterred, however, not merely
by successful suit but by the plausible threat of successful suit, and given
the unlikelihood of inherently source-identifying design, the game of
allowing suit based upon alleged inherent distinctiveness seems to us not
worth the candle.” 46 The Court felt that the harm to competition in the
form of litigation costs (or threat of litigation costs) overwhelmed the
relatively small gains to be had.
Wal-Mart is important when thinking about printable files because
it shows the Court’s attentiveness to litigation realities and willingness
to make bright-line rules to achieve a healthy, competitive market. 47 Of
course any bright-line rule leaves a few individual cases outside of what
might be considered traditional trademark protection, but the clarity and
44. The Court also troublingly punted on the tough boundary between product packaging and
design. It asserted that the issue in Two Pesos, restaurant décor, was “either product packaging . . .
or else some tertium quid that is akin to product packaging and has no bearing on the present case.”
Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 215.
45. Id. at 213.
46. Id. at 214 (emphasis added to show the Court did not assert that source-identifying
product design was impossible).
47. See id. at 213 (“Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of competition with
regard to the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product design ordinarily serves by a rule of law
that facilitates plausible threats of suit against new entrants based upon alleged inherent
distinctiveness. How easy it is to mount a plausible suit depends, of course, upon the clarity of the
test for inherent distinctiveness, and where product design is concerned we have little confidence
that a reasonably clear test can be devised.”).
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efficiency can greatly outweigh the costs. 48 The decision is also
important for its discussion of channeling claims to the various branches
of IP law. The Court noted that its bright-line rule should not cause
significant harm to the product producer, “since the producer can
ordinarily obtain protection for a design that is inherently source
identifying (if any such exists), but that does not yet have secondary
meaning, by securing a design patent or a copyright for the
design . . . .” 49
The Court’s reference to design patent law highlights the IP regime
responsible for encouraging ornamental design. 50 Congress carefully
balanced the tradeoffs of design protection against free competition with
the design patent regime, and allowing trademark law (in the form of
trade dress protection) to further incentivize ornamental design would
upset the delicate balance. It would also ask something new of trademark
law, which traditionally was not used to incentivize creative designs.
Although the Court allowed trade dress protection even if the product
enjoyed design patent protection, it did so only where the secondary
meaning in the product’s shape clearly triggered trademark law’s
overarching consumer confusion principle. 51 Because secondary
meaning is difficult to prove, 52 the Court left open only a very narrow
door. 53
A second Supreme Court decision, issued just one year after WalMart, further weakened trademark law (particularly trade dress law) and
brightened the line between the branches of IP law. In TrafFix Devices,
Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 54 the Court reviewed a claim of trade dress
protection in a dual spring design for roadside signs. The dual spring at
the base of the signs had been the subject of a utility patent (since

48. See, e.g., Lucas S. Osborn, Instrumentalism at the Federal Circuit, 56 St. LOUIS U. L.J.
419, 421 (2011) (discussing the costs and benefits of rules versus standards).
49. Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 214.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 215.
52. See, e.g., Loren Lunsford, Trade Dress in Product Design, MARTENSEN WRIGHT PC,
http://martensenwright.com/da/trade-dress-product-design/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2017) (“Secondary
meaning in a product design is difficult to achieve.”); Vincenti & Vincenti, Wal-Mart and the
Supreme Court’s Diminishment of Inherent Distinctiveness (Sep. 21, 2013), http://vincenti.com/walmart-and-the-supreme-courts-diminishment-of-inherent-distinctiveness/ (noting the “difficult
burden of establishing secondary meaning”).
53. The Court further narrowed the opening by stating that when a court is unsure whether a
feature is product design or product packaging, “courts should err on the side of caution and classify
ambiguous trade dress as product design, thereby requiring secondary meaning.” Wal-Mart, 529
U.S. at 215.
54. 532 U.S. 23, 25 (2001).
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expired), and the accused infringer argued that the dual spring design
could not constitute trade dress because it was functional. 55
The expired utility patent was of vital importance because utility
patent law is the branch of IP responsible for incentivizing utilitarian
inventions. 56 The patent system represents a “carefully crafted bargain”
between incentivizing new and non-obvious invention through patents,
which limit competition through their exclusive rights, and allowing
competition through copying, which dampens inventive endeavors. 57 As
part of that bargain, patents currently enjoy a term of twenty years from
the date of filing. 58 A longer patent term would increase the costs to
society of monopoly pricing and impedance to follow-on technology. 59
The Court was intensely aware that patent holders may attempt to
effectively extend protection past the twenty-year patent term by arguing
that the utilitarian features enjoy trade dress protection. 60 To prevent this
usurpation of the congressional balance, the Court demarcated an
expanse between utility patents and trade dress. Specifically, the Court
held that a prior patent claiming a feature that is later asserted as trade
dress constitutes strong evidence that the feature is functional and not
protectable by trade dress. 61
TrafFix differs from Wal-Mart in an important way. Whereas WalMart envisioned trade dress protection might subsist after a design
patent expired if the owner could demonstrate secondary meaning, 62
TrafFix reiterated that functional features can never enjoy trade dress
protection, regardless of the existence of secondary meaning. 63 In this
instance at least, patent law trumps trademark law because the Court
believed the harms to innovation outweigh any consumer confusion and
loss to the would-be trade dress owner.
At the same time, the Court seemingly refused to rule that utility
patent protection for an object necessarily rendered the product
55. Id. at 25.
56. Lucas S. Osborn, Joshua M. Pearce & Amberlee Haselhuhn, A Case for Weakening
Patent Rights, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1185, 1185-86 (2015).
57. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U. S. 141, 150-51 (1989); Osborn,
Pearce & Haselhuhn, supra note 56, at 1186-88.
58. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2015).
59. Osborn, Pearce & Haselhuhn, supra note 56, at 1186-88.
60. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 28.
61. Id. at 29-30.
62. The Court stated, “We hold that, in an action for infringement of unregistered trade dress
under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a product’s design is distinctive, and therefore protectible, only
upon a showing of secondary meaning.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205,
216 (2000).
63. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 35.
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functional and thus ineligible for trade dress protection. Instead, the
Court adopted a strong presumption that a feature claimed in a utility
patent is functional. 64 The lack of clarity from this presumption has
engendered some criticism, 65 but clearly the decision expanded the
divide between utility patent and trade dress in two ways, one less
significant and one more so. First, somewhat less significantly, it
emphasized that the presumption was a “strong” one. 66 While a strong
presumption is not a precise rule, it sends a clear signal to lower courts
that the divide between the two areas of IP law is important. Second, and
more significantly, the opinion broadened the test for what counts as
functional matter by clarifying (or reinterpreting) its earlier decisions to
state that the primary test for utilitarian functionality is “when [the
feature] is essential to the use or purpose of the device or when it affects
the cost or quality of the device.” 67 This test is easier to meet than the
alternate test, which asks whether the particular feature leads to a
“significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.” 68
The Court’s significant expansion of the test for utilitarian
functionality and its strong presumption regarding previously patented
features effectively erected a bar to trade dress protection for previously
patented features. It is difficult to imagine a feature that was claimed in a
patent ever escaping the presumption of functionality. Patent claims are
highly technical, and every word in a claim limits the scope of the patent
and reduces the scope of the patentee’s right to exclude others. Only a
poor patent drafter would include a superfluous, non-utilitarian feature in
a patent claim.
In addition, the TrafFix Court built on Wal-Mart and amplified its
attention to the desirability of competitive copying. Rather than viewing
copying pejoratively as undesirable free-riding or theft, the Court
emphasized that “unless an intellectual property right such as a patent or
copyright protects an item, it will be subject to copying” and noted that
“copying is not always discouraged or disfavored by the laws which
64. Id. at 29-30 (“A prior patent, we conclude, has vital significance in resolving the trade
dress claim. A utility patent is strong evidence that the features therein claimed are functional. If
trade dress protection is sought for those features the strong evidence of functionality based on the
previous patent adds great weight to the statutory presumption that features are deemed functional
until proved otherwise by the party seeking trade dress protection.”).
65. See, e.g., Sheldon W. Halpern, A High Likelihood of Confusion: Wal-Mart, TrafFix,
Moseley, and Dastar—The Supreme Court’s New Trademark Jurisprudence, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 237, 257 (2005) (“In short, without a categorical preclusion rule, it seems that the Court
effectively elided answering the question before it . . . .”).
66. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29-30.
67. Id. at 33.
68. Id.
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preserve our competitive economy. Allowing competitors to copy will
have salutary effects in many instances.” 69
In the end, the TrafFix Court emphasized and sharpened the core
dividing principle between trademark law and patent law: if a feature is
functional, it cannot enjoy trade dress protection, regardless of whether it
designates source. 70 In short, although confusion is the touchstone of
trademark law, sometimes the law will permit confusion to avoid
conflicting with other areas of IP law.
Finally, a third case, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., 71 set further boundaries for trademark law. Dastar copied footage
from Fox’s Crusade in Europe television series and reused portions of
that footage in its own videos, crediting itself as the producer and
distributor and providing no attribution to Fox. 72 Fox alleged Dastar
committed reverse passing off in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act
by representing Fox’s content as its own. 73 (Fox could not bring a
copyright claim based on the Crusade series, because the copyright had
lapsed. 74) The Supreme Court rejected Fox’s claim, holding that “origin
of goods” refers only to the “producer of the tangible goods that are
offered for sale, and not to the author of any idea, concept, or
communication embodied in those goods.” 75 In creating a distinction
between tangible goods and the author of ideas, concepts, or
communications, the Court was concerned that allowing claims for
reverse passing off in the context of copyrightable works “would create
a species of mutant copyright law” that would conflict with the Federal
copyright regime. 76 Moreover, the decision was not limited to concerns
about overlap with copyright law; the justices also worried that § 43(a)
might be used to “create[] a species of perpetual patent . . . .” 77
Others have written extensively about Dastar’s potentially dramatic
scope. 78 The decision is not limited to public domain works. 79 Further,
69. Id. at 29 (citation omitted).
70. Id. at 29-30.
71. 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
72. Id. at 26-27.
73. Id. at 28.
74. Id. at 37.
75. Id. at 37.
76. Id. at 34 (“[A]llowing a cause of action under § 43(a) for [a representation that Dastar
originated the creative work in the videos] would create a species of mutant copyright law that
limits the public’s ‘federal right to “copy and to use”‘ expired copyrights.”) (quoting Bonito Boats,
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U. S. 141, 165 (1989)).
77. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37.
78. See generally Mark P. McKenna, Dastar’s Next Stand, 19 J. INTELL. PROP.L. 357 (2012)
[hereinafter McKenna, Next Stand].

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017

13

Akron Law Review, Vol. 50 [2017], Iss. 4, Art. 6

878

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[50:865

though courts offer mixed results, the decision should not be limited to
reverse passing off cases. 80 Instead of narrowly and formalistically
limiting Dastar to claims of “origin,” courts should also apply it to
assertions that consumers will be confused by intangible content as to
whether the plaintiff was the “source,” provided “sponsorship,” or was
“affiliated” with the defendants goods. 81 Otherwise, Dastar’s scope
would be trifling, because plaintiffs would simply recast their claims
from “origin” to “affiliation” or the like. 82
Dastar includes several interrelated facets relevant to trademark
rights in 3D printable digital files. First, the decision stands for the idea
that intellectual origins of goods are irrelevant to trademark law and that
such concerns should be channeled to copyright law or patent law, if
anywhere. 83 The Court stated,
In sum, reading the phrase “origin of goods” in the Lanham Act in accordance with the Act’s common-law foundations (which were not designed to protect originality or creativity), and in light of the copyright
and patent laws (which were), we conclude that the phrase refers to the
producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to the
author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those
goods. 84

The Court did not rule out that some consumers might care about a
product’s intellectual origins (i.e., its authorship), but, like in Wal-Mart,
the Court made a simplifying rule because it considered those concerns
comparatively unimportant for trademark law. 85
Second, the Court segregated intangible content from tangible
goods, stating that trademark law is concerned only with “the producer
of the tangible goods that are offered for sale.” 86 As discussed below,
this aspect of the decision can hold profound consequences for digital
content such as 3D printing files. 87
Finally, the decision highlighted trademark law’s limited
79. Id. at 373-75 (discussing cases); Mark P. McKenna & Lucas S. Osborn, Trademarks and
Digital Goods, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1425 (2017) (discussing cases).
80. McKenna, Next Stand, supra note 78, at 376-80.
81. Id. at 376.
82. Id. at 377.
83. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003) (emphasis in
original).
84. Id.
85. McKenna, Next Stand, supra note 78, at 372.
86. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37. Of course, trademark law broadly includes service marks, which
involve intangible services. But Dastar did not concern service marks.
87. See infra Section III.
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boundaries and reiterated its holdings in Wal-Mart and TrafFix,
including their solicitous view of copying. The Court emphasized that
Wal-Mart’s “carefully considered limitation” (i.e., that product design
cannot be inherently distinctive) “would be entirely pointless if the
‘original’ producer could turn around and pursue a reverse-passing-off
claim under exactly the same provision of the Lanham Act.” 88 The Court
recognized that a broad reading of “origin” would support the plaintiff’s
suit rejected in TrafFix, stating that the “plaintiff, whose patents on
flexible road signs had expired, and who could not prevail on a tradedress claim under § 43(a) because the features of the signs were
functional, would have had a reverse-passing-off claim for unattributed
copying of his design.” 89
Indeed, TrafFix contained hints of a constitutional dimension to the
functionality doctrine by invoking Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc. 90 and emphasizing the role of a broad public domain when
patent or copyright law does not apply or has expired. 91 The Court
refused to tackle that question, but left the possibility open to consider it
in the future. 92 At a minimum, TrafFix demonstrates the Court’s
willingness to transpose a policy concern for a robust public domain in
federal preemption cases into cases solely concerning federal law. Some
even argue that TrafFix “suggests a limit on Congress’s power to rely on
other constitutional powers, such as the Commerce Clause, to remove
product features from the public domain.” 93
Dastar greatly amplified TrafFix’s policy predilections by invoking
Bonito Boats and related cases. In explaining why the Lanham Act
88. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 36-37.
89. Id. at 37.
90. 489 U.S. 141 (1989). Bonito Boats was largely about federal preemption based on
intellectual property laws, but it used strong language in favor of a robust public domain that
scholars understand to articulate a Constitutional dimension to the argument that unpatentable
utilitarian product features should be in the public domain. See Margreth Barrett, Consolidating the
Diffuse Paths to Trade Dress Functionality: Encountering TrafFix on the Way to Sears, 61 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 79, 141 (2004).
91. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001); see also
Barrett, supra note 90, at 137-46 (2004) (discussing this distinction and citing relevant case law).
Cf. Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Copying in the Shadow of the Constitution: The Rational Limits of Trade
Dress Protection, 80 MINN. L. REV. 595, 618-27 (1996).
92. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 35 (“TrafFix and some of its amici argue that the Patent Clause of
the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of its own force, prohibits the holder of an expired utility patent
from claiming trade dress protection. We need not resolve this question. If, despite the rule that
functional features may not be the subject of trade dress protection, a case arises in which trade
dress becomes the practical equivalent of an expired utility patent, that will be time enough to
consider the matter.”) (citations omitted).
93. Barrett, supra note 90, at 141.
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should not conflict with copyright and patent law, the Court recalled
several of its cases, all of which favor a robust public domain. 94 As a
result, scholars and courts have largely understood the Dastar Court’s
broad purpose in fashioning the boundaries between trademark law and
other IP. 95
Collectively, Wal-Mart, TrafFix, and Dastar stand for the clear
proposition that “trademark law will be applied sparingly, if at all, and
only in the context of strong inhibitory presumptions, to create exclusive
rights in matter that the public has a right to copy.” 96 The decisions
approvingly bless many forms of copying as normal and advantageous.
Moreover, the decisions represent trademark law’s turn away from a
proprietary rights paradigm and toward a consumer protection
rationale. 97
III. TRADEMARK BOUNDARIES AND 3D PRINTING
Keeping the Supreme Court’s emphasis on beneficial copying and
strong boundaries between branches of IP law in mind, this Article now
turns to the application of trademark law to 3D printing technology.
At the outset, this Article must address the rather prosaic
application of trade dress law to 3D printed goods. Surprisingly, scholars
have intimated that 3D printing’s most profound impacts will be directed
toward trade dress, as opposed to trademarks. For instance, Professors
Desai and Magliocca state that, other than patents and copyright, the
“final type of intellectual property that is ripe for disruption by 3D

94. The Court stated:
The problem with this argument according special treatment to communicative products
is that it causes the Lanham Act to conflict with the law of copyright, which addresses
that subject specifically. The right to copy, and to copy without attribution, once a copyright has expired, like “the right to make [an article whose patent has expired] including
the right to make it in precisely the shape it carried when patented-passes to the public.”
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U. S. 225, 230 (1964); see also Kellogg Co. v.
National Biscuit Co., 305 U. S. 111, 121-122 (1938). “In general, unless an intellectual
property right such as a patent or copyright protects an item, it will be subject to copying.” TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U. S. 23, 29 (2001). The
rights of a patentee or copyright holder are part of a “carefully crafted bargain,” Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U. S. 141, 150-151 (1989), under which,
once the patent or copyright monopoly has expired, the public may use the invention or
work at will and without attribution.
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33-34 (2003).
95. See McKenna, Next Stand, supra note 78, at 377-81 (interpreting Dastar and citing
cases).
96. Halpern, supra note 65, at 270.
97. Id. at 271.
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printing is trade dress.” 98 It is true that 3D printing will facilitate the
manufacturing of uniquely shaped objects and the copying of those
objects. But I consider these phenomena comparatively less interesting
because they do not challenge trademark doctrine in any unique way.
That is, the law will apply to the 3D printed shape the same way it
applies to the injection-molded or hand-crafted shape. 3D printing may
increase the frequency of trade dress issues, but the issues will not differ
in kind in any way unique to trade dress.
3D printing’s more profound effects on trademark law, including
but not limited to trade dress law, result from consumers’ disassociation
of product design from product manufacturing (a phenomenon that
recalls Wal-Mart’s discussion of product design) and their ability to
create, copy, and exchange digital files that embody product design. 99
Trademark law’s origins lie almost exclusively in concerns related to
manufacturing and ownership of physical goods. 100 The manufacturer
affixed the trademark to the manufactured good (or allowed a merchant
to do the same) to indicate responsibility for manufacturing quality, and
consumers relied on it for the same purpose. 101
A world of 3D printing commoditizes manufacturing: it can occur
either in the individual home or at a 3D printing shop selected by the
end-user. 102 Consumers no longer expect a physical object to emanate
from an anonymous source; the consumer can control the manufacturing
source. In this way, 3D printing demystifies trademarks, and perhaps
brands more generally, as consumers no longer associate trademarks
with manufacturing prowess. 103 The ramifications of this shift are
98. Deven R. Desai & Gerard N. Magliocca, Patents, Meet Napster: 3D Printing and the
Digitization of Things, 102 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1709 (2014) (emphasis added); see also Amanda
Scardamaglia, Flashpoints in 3D Printing and Trade Mark Law, 23 J. L. INFO. & SCI. 30 (2015)
(leading the substantive legal discussion with a focus on trade dress protection).
99. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 215 (2000).
100. See, e.g., FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING
TO TRADE-MARKS 20-63 (1925); FRANCIS H. UPTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADE MARKS
22 (1860) (stating that the fundamental policy of trademark law was “to protect the manufacturer,
who by his skill and industry, has produced an article of merchandise, that has found favor with the
public, and which he has designated by a particular name or mark.”). Cf. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37
(holding that “origin of goods” refers only to the “producer of the tangible goods that are offered for
sale, and not to the author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those goods”).
101. UPTON, supra note 100, at 22.
102. See, e.g., THINGIVERSE, thingiverse.com (last visited Feb. 7, 2017) which will print
objects for users if the user provides the digital file.
103. That is not to say some trademark owners will not seek to manufacture their own goods.
Rather, the mere presence of multiple manufacturing options severs the historical assumed
connection between trademarks and manufacturing source. There exists a rough analogy to the
merchandizing cases in which logos of sports teams or universities adorn all sorts of clothing and
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profound, and point to an environment where trademark law has
decreased salience for the content of digital files.
Consider the 3D printable files available on numerous websites,
such as the files on Turbosquid’s website that will print all sorts of
branded content. 104 When a user goes to Turbosquid’s website, she is
greeted with thousands of files, many containing trademarks in their
content. One such file is of a model of a Chevrolet truck, complete with
internal trademarks appearing on the (digital) car just as on a “real”
Chevy truck. The website will usually have an indication that the file
was created by a particular entity, such as “HKV Studios.” In the image
below of a Chevrolet truck, the creator’s name is listed near the top-right
corner, below the item description. 105

accessories, which were relatively easy to manufacture. People often bought the clothes not
understanding the logo to indicate source, but merely desiring to express loyalty to the team or
school. Trademark law grew to police much of this activity through the unwieldy concepts of
sponsorship or affiliation confusion, but not without growing pains and continuing dissent. See, e.g.,
Dogan & Lemley, supra note 31; Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62
STAN. L. REV. 413, 448-49 (2010) [hereinafter Lemley & McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion]. 3D
printing technology decentralizes and commoditizes manufacturing to a much greater extent than tshirt and baseball hats, and thus sponsorship or affiliation doctrines should not be blithely applied
without scrutiny.
104. Recall that BMW sued Turbosquid for hosting and selling digital models of BMW cars
(though these were not 3D printable. Josh Mings, BMW Group Sues Turbosquid for Selling 3D
Models of Their Car Designs, SOLIDSMACK (Aug. 4, 2016), http://www.solidsmack.com/caddesign-news/bmw-group-sues-turbosquid-for-selling-3d-models-of-their-car-designs/.
105. Image
captured
from
2016
Chevrolet
Silverado,
TURBOSQUID,
http://www.turbosquid.com/3d-models/3d-2016-chevrolet-silverado-model/984941 on November
25, 2016 (last visited Feb. 7, 2017). This particular file is not 3D printable, but numerous files are.
Because, as explained below, the 3D printable Ford model truck did not include an artist’s name, I
did not use the image here.
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When a shopper on Turbosquid’s website encounters the Chevy
mark in the file, what does it signify: the origin of the content of the
digital file (i.e., the idea of a Chevy truck) or the origin or sponsorship of
the file itself? Given the website’s context, the Chevy mark on the truck
does not suggest the origin of the actual file, but only the origin of the
content or idea embodied in the file. The website environment as a
whole tells a reasonable user that Turbosquid either creates the files or
hosts others’ creations. Indeed, Turbosquid’s website, by stating that the
file is created “by HKV Studios,” unmistakably tells the consumer that
HKV Studios is the origin of the file. 106 With this information in hand, a
reasonable user would understand the file’s title, “2016 Chevrolet
Silverado,” to be nominative fair use as to what type of automobile the
model is based on. 107 How else could a user seeking a model of a 2017
Chevrolet Silverado easily find one? In the vast majority of other digital
files, the context will likewise show that the files originate from
someone other than the owner of the trademarks appearing within the
file. In fact, some websites, like thepiratesbay.org, convey rebellion
against brand owners.
A similar understanding as to source, sponsorship, and affiliation
indication drove the Dastar decision. The logic was so compelling that
Dastar created a bright-line rule, holding that “origin” for purposes of
the Lanham Act refers only to the origin of tangible goods. 108 Fox
wanted the intangible content (the movie footage) to signify the physical
tapes’ origins, but the Court refused. The Court decided that trademark
law’s purposes were ill-served when applied to intangible content. 109 In
the context of 3D printable files, Dastar bars a Lanham Act claim to the
extent an internal trademark merely refers to the origin of the intangible
106. Id. The text on the right-hand side of the image shows that Turbosquid included a
disclaimer that GM did not authorize the use of the Chevy logo. This disclaimer further dispels any
possible confusion at the point of sale, but should not be necessary as discussed herein. Similarly,
purchasers of files likely do not view the marks appearing in the file as indicating sponsorship or
affiliation, but rather as a necessary incident to verisimilitude. See infra note 120 and accompanying
text.
107. Nominative fair use arises when a third party uses another’s trademark out of necessity to
describe the third party’s own product or service. See, e.g., Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d
1139, 1155 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the sale of collectibles bearing the name and likeness of
Princess Diana was a nominative fair use); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425
F.3d 211, 218-21 (3d Cir. 2005) (establishing nominative fair use as an affirmative defense).
108. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 60 (2003). Recall the
Court also adopted a bright-line rule in Wal-Mart based on the belief that any exception to the rule
was not significant enough to warrant a doctrinal trademark response. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 214 (2000).
109. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37.
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content of a file, as opposed to the origin of the file itself.
This result may sound shocking to those accustomed to a
permission culture in which any use of a mark other than the most
obvious nominative use seemingly requires the trademark owner’s
authorization. But the result follows naturally from the overarching
channeling principles of Wal-Mart, TrafFix, and Dastar. Those
decisions emphasize that there are certain uses of a trademark—
sometimes even source-identifying uses—that are simply not the
concern of trademark law. Where a mark conveys primarily intellectual
origin as opposed to origin, affiliation, or sponsorship of the file itself,
trademark law should not forbid the use.
Dastar represents the most directly applicable case to printable files
because, although the Dastar films were tangible, the allegedly sourceidentifying content was not. Likewise, 3D printable files (as stored on a
memory medium) can be considered tangible, but their content, even the
trademarks appearing within the file, are not. It is of course possible for
courts to interpret Dastar narrowly to apply only to creative intangible
content, such as a movie, as distinct from an actual trademark appearing
in intangible content. But that is not what Dastar said, and it is not the
best reading of Dastar. Such a reading of Dastar would forbid one from
publicly showing a full-length movie that has entered the public domain
merely because a movie studio’s trademark appears at the movie’s
beginning and ending.
None of this is to say that digital files are per se immune from
trademark infringement analysis. Some consumers will care about the
source of the digital file they purchase. 110 They may want to ensure that
the file will actually print a quality version of the object, 111 or they may
want the prestige or the peace of mind from having the “original” or
“authorized” version. 112 Trademark policy applies most forcefully where
consumers are confused into buying an item, even a file, wrongfully
believing it to have originated from a particular source. This again raises
110. See, e.g., Desai & Magliocca, supra note 98, at 1713 (“Many people will want to buy
from a brand that . . . guarantees safe files.”).
111. If a file contains certain errors, those errors will manifest in the printed version of the
object. Errors can include fundamental design errors (such as locating a car’s fuel tank too close to
an area that would suffer damage in a car crash, thus risking fire) and essentially typographical
errors (such as accidentally drawing a piece the wrong shape).
112. Consider the continued popularity of “real” diamonds, even though virtually
indistinguishable human-made diamonds have existed for years. See, e.g., Sri Jegarajah, Would You
Buy
a
‘Man-Made’
Diamond?,
CNBC
(Apr.
16,
2013,
8:50
PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/100647697 (quoting a De Beers employee as stating, “The majority of
consumers have told us during extensive independent research that they want the real thing and
aren’t prepared to settle for anything less.”).
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the question of how consumers obtain information about source with 3D
printable files and requires careful distinction between the source of the
file itself and the source of the intellectual creation depicted in the file.
With digital files, source or affiliation indication occurs primarily
from sources external to the file. Where file creation is easy and
widespread, external source indication will play an important role, a role
consonant with trademark law policies. If a digital file provider created a
website that looked as if it was owned or endorsed by General Motors,
consumers would likely be confused as to the source or affiliation of the
files for sale thereon. Also, if Turbosquid were to state that the digital
file of the Chevy truck depicted above was “created by General Motors,”
when in fact it was not, trademark infringement clearly would exist. 113
For an example of potentially actionable trademark infringement, look
closely at the text on the image below of a 3D printable Ford truck
model on Turbosquid’s website. 114

Notice that, unlike the Chevy truck example, there is no indication in the
top-right corner of who created the file. Moreover, the assertion that the
file represented an “officially licensed product” of Ford constitutes
trademark use external to the file that is likely to cause consumer
113. A more nuanced situation involves the labeling of the file a “2016 Chevrolet Silvarado”,
but this is nominative use given the surrounding context.
114. Image captured from All-New Ford F-150 Raptor STL, TURBOSQUID,
http://www.turbosquid.com/3d-models/3ds-all-new-f-150-raptor-stl/933073 (last visited Feb. 7,
2017).
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confusion if the statement is not true.
Although Turbosquid found it advantageous to enter into a
licensing agreement with Ford when offering these files, that does not
mean trademark law would require a license. 115 Indeed, the trio of
Dastar, Wal-Mart, and TrafFix suggest that the internal content of a 3D
printable file is unlikely to cause confusion as to source or affiliation.
Dastar in particular speaks with force against presuming consumer
associations derived from the internal content of a file. Dastar does not
represent a physicalist view of trademark law, that is, a view that
property rights can only exist in relation to a physical object. 116 Rather, it
demonstrates the Court’s belief that a bright-line between the origins of
tangible goods and intangible content best establishes, or at least best
approximates, the proper role of trademark law.
The following subsections offer an apology for channeling the
internal content of 3D printable files away from trademark infringement.
In the process, I analyze how and when 3D printing technology
challenges assumptions about trademark law’s normative objectives. The
analysis provides a foundation for analyzing not just 3D printable files,
but all digital files.
A.

Consumer Protection Rationale

Dastar’s focus on tangible goods to the exclusion of a digital file’s
content accords with the consumer protection rationale of trademark law.
This rationale posits that trademark law exists to improve the quality of
information in the marketplace, thereby protecting consumers from
being deceived into buying products they did not mean to and generally
reducing consumer search costs. 117 In the context of physical goods, I
buy a good bearing a trademark I know and like because I believe it has
been manufactured by or on behalf of the same source and will be of the
same quality as other goods bearing a similar mark.
But as already described, this rationale breaks down in the context
of printable files. Where the website’s context suggests that “HKV
Studios” created the digital file, a consumer is not confused as to
whether GM created the file. Of course the consumer recognizes the
Chevy mark, but mere recognition of a mark does not prove

115. I do not analyze dilution in this Article.
116. Cf. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The
Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 331-32 (1980)
(characterizing Blackstone’s view of property as physicalist).
117. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 27, at 417.
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confusion. 118 The mark is present to make the model look like a “real”
Chevy truck, but that does not mean that GM created the model. 119
Nor does the logo signify meaningful sponsorship or affiliation,
except perhaps under circular reasoning or a broad definition of those
terms. 120 Where numerous artists compete to make quality digital
versions of real-world objects, logos “inside” the digital file become a
necessary ingredient to verisimilitude. Consumers do not buy the file
because they think GM sponsored it; they buy it because they want
something that looks like a GM car. As long as the external context does
not claim sponsorship or affiliation in a manner material to
consumers, 121 the verisimilitude exists for reasons related to healthy
118. Some cases are to the contrary. See Boston Professional Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap &
Emblem Manufacturing, Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868
(1975) (“The certain knowledge of the buyer that the source and origin of the trademark symbols
were in plaintiffs satisfies the [confusion] requirement of the [Lanham Act]. The argument that
confusion must be as to the source of the manufacture of the emblem itself is unpersuasive, where
the trademark, originated by the team, is the triggering mechanism for the sale of the emblem.”).
But see Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 711, 721 (W.D. Pa. 1983)
(“There is no evidence that the consumer cares who has made the soft goods or whether they were
made under license.”). Regarding digital files, a rough parallel can be drawn to cases where marks
are used in art, because contextually consumers and viewers of the artwork do not normally assume
the trademarks indicate source or affiliation. See, e.g., University of Alabama Bd. of Trustees v.
New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2012) (relying on a balancing of First Amendment and
trademark concerns to find no trademark infringement in painting); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc.,
332 F.3d 915, 928-29 (6th Cir. 2003) (same); Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1212,
1216 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (noting in dicta that because artist Andy Warhol’s painting of common goods
“does not use the trademarked names or product designs to identify the source of the painting, his
use does not imply endorsement of the artwork by either Campbell’s or Coca–Cola”).
119. 3D printing files have been analogized to blueprints. If I buy a blueprint for making a
particular branded good from you, the presence of the trademark in the blueprint doesn’t tell me the
source of the blueprint. Further, if the blueprint bears the legend, “created by [you],” I know you are
the origin.
120. Regarding a broad reading of sponsorship or affiliation, the broadest definitions would
swallow dilution. Regarding circular reasoning, the law can be a significant factor to shape
consumer expectations such that, in circular fashion, if the law repeatedly gives trademark holders
remedies on an assumption of consumer expectations, the expectations will eventually come into
being. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 27, at 396-97; William McGeveran & Mark P. McKenna,
Confusion Isn’t Everything, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 315-16 (2013); Lemley & McKenna,
Irrelevant Confusion, supra note 103, at 438-42; James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion
in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 912 (2007). Cf. Felix Cohen, Transcendental
Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 815 (1935) (speaking to propertylike protections for trademarks more generally and stating “The vicious circle inherent in this
reasoning is plain. It purports to base legal protection upon economic value, when, as a matter of
actual fact, the economic value of a sales device depends upon the extent to which it will be legally
protected”); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the
Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 405 (1990).
121. Lemley & McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, supra note 103, at 448-49 (arguing that
confusion as to sponsorship or affiliation should only be relevant where they are material to
consumers’ decisions). Marketing literature suggests that even if consumers were to have a bad
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competition. Inside the digital file, trademarks are the coin of
competition, not tools for deception.
Even in jurisdictions that might presume, contrary to reality for
most digital files, that a trademark in the digital file indicates
sponsorship or affiliation, a website operator can devise the appropriate
disclaimer. Indeed, the Turbosquid example of the Chevy truck included
a disclaimer. It is true that not all disclaimers, particularly inconspicuous
ones, are effective. 122 But no court has infantilized consumers so much
as to hold that no disclaimers are effective. 123 Nevertheless, under
current law, courts doubt the efficacy of disclaimers and often put the
burden of proving their efficacy on the defendant. 124 Where material
confusion is already unlikely without disclaimers, the law’s dubiousness
towards them tends to suppress competition.
Disclaimers should generally not be required because 3D printing
technology decouples trademarks as indicators of manufacturing source
by severing the historical connection between design and manufacturing.
In this environment, the consumer protection rationale suggests turning
the focus away from the appearance of the object, including any
trademarks thereon, and toward the external indicia of the file’s
source. 125 As discussed, even if a 3D printable file of a widget includes a
(digital) trademark in its content, that does not by itself lead to consumer
confusion about who created or endorsed the file. Without confusion at
the point of sale, trademark law’s fundamental policy concern is
generally not triggered. 126
experience with a digital file they believe is sponsored or affiliated with a trademark owner, they
would not impute that disappointment to the core (physical) product. See id. at 430-35.
122. See, e.g., Weight Watchers Int’l, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 744 F. Supp. 1259 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (holding that a disclaimer in “minuscule print” did “not effectively eliminate the misleading
impression conveyed in the ad’s large headline”); Shell Co. (Puerto Rico) Ltd. v. Los Frailes
Service Station, Inc., 605 F.3d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 2010) (stating that gas station’s disclaimer signs
“were not prominently displayed”).
123. See, e.g., HBO, Inc. v. Showtime/Movie Channel, Inc., 832 F.2d 1311, 1315 (2d Cir.
1987) (“In many circumstances a disclaimer can avoid the problem of objectionable infringement by
significantly reducing or eliminating consumer confusion by making clear the source of a
product.”).
124. See id. at 1316.
125. See supra notes 104-14 and accompanying text (discussing external indicia of a file’s
source).
126. See, e.g., Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Int’l., Inc., 730 F.3d 494, 513
(6th Cir. 2013) (“No harm is done to this incentive structure, however, by the copying of a product
design that does not confuse consumers as to the product’s source. . . . [T]rademark law, like the law
of unfair competition of which it is a part, focuses not on copying per se, but on confusion.”);
Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 301 (2d Cir.1917) (“The plaintiff has the
right not to lose his customers through false representations that those are his wares which in fact
are not, but he may not monopolize any design or pattern, however trifling. The defendant, on the
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On the other hand, given the ease with which people can create
design files, trademark law in some ways becomes more important in a
digital world. As design files proliferate, the search cost reductions that
trademarks bring become proportionally more important. But courts
must be careful to apply trademark law to source indicators that are
actually material to consumers. 127 Consumers will sometimes care who
created the digital file and should be able to rely on a source indicator
(such as the user name of the person or company who created the file or
the name of the web host) for that information. An entity’s reputation for
creating or hosting quality files will be important to consumers sifting
through a sea of files. But consumers will look for these important
indicia outside of the file’s content.
Even assuming no point of sale confusion, however, trademark law
has extended consumer protection to confusion arising after the sale. In a
typical scenario, buyers of tangible items knowingly buy knockoff goods
at a flea market or a “Canal street” and there is no confusion at the point
of sale. 128 Courts have dealt with the lack of confusion in flea market
sales and the like by creating the doctrine of post-sale confusion. 129 The
doctrine typically posits that although the initial purchaser is not
confused, third party bystanders will see the purchaser wearing/using the
fake good and will be confused about its source. 130 The Supreme Court
has never endorsed the doctrine, and it is often criticized. 131
Even accepting the post-sale confusion doctrine with physical
other hand, may copy plaintiff’s goods slavishly down to the minutest detail: but he may not
represent himself as the plaintiff in their sale.”).
127. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 27, at 483 (“[C]ourts should focus the confusion analysis on
material information, defined as information about a product that will influence consumer buying.”).
128. See generally Jonathan M. Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal Street: Reflections on
Status Consumption, Intellectual Property, and the Incentive Thesis, 91 VA. L. REV. 1381 (2005).
129. See Lemley & McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, supra note 30, at 152-53. Some courts think
Congress intended to endorse post-sale confusion when it amended the Lanham Act in 1962 to
remove reference to deceiving “purchasers,” thus prohibiting any use “likely to cause confusion, or
to cause mistake, or to deceive.” Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, § 17, 76 Stat. 769, 773
(1962) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000)); see, e.g., Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point
Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 295 (3d Cir. 2001); Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1245
(6th Cir. 1991). Courts are reading too much into the 1962 amendment, as its purpose was to ensure
that the Lanham Act provision “relates to potential purchasers as well as to actual purchasers.” H.R.
REP. NO. 87-1108, at 4, 8 (1961); See Lunney, supra note 27, at 469-75.
130. See Jeremy N. Sheff, Veblen Brands, 96 MINN. L. REV. 769, 778-94 (2012) (discussing
three strands of post-sale confusion jurisprudence).
131. See, e.g., id. at 776 (proposing that “post-sale confusion doctrine should be discarded
entirely”). Some courts have applied the doctrine with an apparent lack of enthusiasm. See Gibson
Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d 539, 549, 552-53 (6th Cir. 2005) (rejecting
plaintiff’s post-sale confusion argument because the accused guitars were not “clearly inferior” to
the plaintiff’s).
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goods, it is inapposite to 3D printable files. In many instances, the
purchaser or transferee of the file will 3D print it and perhaps use the
printed item in public. The bystanders who are the allegedly confused
party in post-sale confusion, however, are not seeing the thing (the file)
that the purchaser bought. Instead, they are seeing something very
different: the physical object made from a combination of the file, a 3D
printer, and the material used in printing. Even if the bystanders are
confused, they are not confused by the thing (the file) the seller
transferred to the buyer. It is analogous to a seller who sells a blueprint
or raw materials to a second party who then creates the infringing goods.
In each situation, post-sale confusion is not applicable. 132
The distinction between a 3D printed object and its corresponding
digital file, and that distinction’s effect on a post-sale confusion analysis,
represents one of the most provocative challenges 3D printing
technology poses to trademark policy. But it has gone completely
unnoticed in the literature. 133 Brand owners will need to rely on indirect
infringement, with its limitations, to attempt to stop the seller of the
file. 134
Printed instantiations of the files should not factor into a post-sale
confusion analysis for a second fundamental reason. Specifically, when
3D printing technology is mature and ubiquitous, the relationship
between design and manufacturing is severed such that the appearance
of a physical good will not generally speak to a single design-andmanufacturing source. 135 The quality of a physical good will speak as
much to the wearer’s choice of 3D printer as to the CAD file that
contained the printing instructions. Moreover, the facility with which
users can alter CAD files further disassociates physical goods from their
design source. 136

132. But see General Motors Co. v. Urban Gorilla, LLC, No. 2:06–CV–00133 BSJ, 2010 WL
5395065 (D. Utah Dec. 27, 2010) (finding body kits that the user bought and attached to a truck to
make it look like a Hummer gave rise to post-sale confusion). Cf. Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabriche
Automibili E Corse v. Roberts, 739 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Tenn. 1990) (finding a kit-car for a Ferrari
lookalike infringed, but not mentioning post-sale confusion). The kit car cases, even if properly
decided, can be distinguished because the seller sold a physical item used directly by the buyer.
133. Scholars have, however, noted how 3D printing changes consumer perception of source
and the corresponding effects on post-sale confusion, which is discussed in the following paragraph.
See Desai & Magliocca, supra note 98, at 1710-11; James Grace, Note, The End of Post-Sale
Confusion: How Consumer 3D Printing Will Diminish the Function of Trademarks, 28 HARV. J. L.
& TECH. 263, 275-80 (2014).
134. See infra Section III.D for a discussion of indirect infringement.
135. See Desai & Magliocca, supra note 98, at 1711; Grace, supra note 133, at 278.
136. A proponent of strong trademark protection could argue for the opposite. If 3D printing
makes the public less sure about the manufacturing origins of a good, then trademark law should
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In other instances, a purchaser or transferee of a file may not 3D
print a physical version. Instead, the buyer may offer the file for sale (or
for free) to others. In that case, too, post-sale confusion does not apply.
The original seller will not be guilty of direct infringement 137 based on a
post-sale confusion analysis because the purchaser/reseller is not selling
the exact file that the original seller transferred to her. Rather, the
purchaser/reseller is selling a copy of the file. The original seller is
analogous to someone who sells a knock-off baseball hat at a swap meet.
If the buyer uses that hat as the basis to make ten more identical hats, the
original seller cannot be liable as a direct infringer for the ten hats the
buyer subsequently created. In short, post-sale confusion only applies to
the item sold or transferred, not to copies of it.
Some might argue that downstream copies of digital files should
count as post-sale confusion because intermediate purchasers can easily
copy the digital files. But this would usurp the doctrine of indirect
infringement. Further, in the patent context the Supreme Court has
strictly distinguished between copies of files versus original files. In
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 138 the Supreme Court analyzed § 271(f)
of the Patent Act, which basically renders anyone an infringer who
exports either the unassembled components of a claimed invention or
those components that have no substantial non-infringing uses. 139 AT&T
claimed that the master software disks Microsoft sent overseas infringed
its patent claim that required the combination of a physical computer and
the software. 140 Because the software only represented a component of
the claimed combination, AT&T sought relief under § 271(f).141 There
was one problem: Microsoft did not load the exported master disks
directly onto computers; instead, it made copies of the master disks and
combined the copy with a computer. 142
The Court thought it vitally important that the software Microsoft
exported was not loaded onto the computers, and thus the Court found
Microsoft did not infringe. 143 Instead, only a copy had been combined
police printed goods assiduously so as to preserve the information transmission policy for finished
goods. From a practical standpoint, stopping all or most individualized 3D printed products is
probably impossible. From a theoretical perspective, the argument raises normative issues regarding
trademark-as-property arguments, some of which are discussed in the following subsection.
137. As discussed infra, the seller may be liable for indirect infringement.
138. 550 U.S. 437 (2007).
139. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)-(2) (2012).
140. Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 442, 446.
141. Id. at 442.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 453-54. The Court’s decision was influenced in part by the presumption against
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws.
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with the computer to form the patented invention. 144 AT&T argued that
distinguishing between the original and the copy created a “loophole”
for software makers because copying software is effortless, but the Court
rejected this argument, reasoning that any loophole “is properly left for
Congress to consider, and to close if it finds such action warranted.” 145
Analogously, in the trademark context, copies of files (and prints of
digital files) should not factor in to any post-sale confusion analysis
because they are distinct entities from the thing originally sold.
In sum, Dastar’s instruction to shift focus away from files’ digital
content is consonant with trademark law’s consumer protection
rationale. Properly understood and applied, the ruling preserves the
integrity of the marketplace while fostering creativity and competition.
In addition, as the next subsection discusses, the holding maintains
calibrated incentives for producers to invest in making quality goods.
B.

Producer Incentive Rationale

The second primary trademark law pillar—the producer incentive
rationale—can likewise justify channeling the internal content of 3D
printable files away from trademark law. Or, at least a version of the
rationale can. Generally, the producer incentive rationale posits that
trademark law incentivizes companies to invest in manufacturing highquality goods by allowing the trademark holder to control use of the
mark in certain circumstances, thereby protecting consumers’
associations between the high-quality goods and the producer. 146 This
view is associated with a property-centric view of trademark law. But
the doctrinal contours of a property-centric view of trademark law
depend greatly on one’s conception of property as applied to
trademarks. 147
144. Id.
145. Id. at 457.
146. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (stating that
trademark law lowers consumer search costs because it “quickly and easily assures a potential
customer that this item-the item with this mark-is made by the same producer as other similarly
marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past. At the same time, the law helps assure a
producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards
associated with a desirable product. The law thereby ‘encourage[s] the production of quality
products’ . . . .”) (quoting MCCARTHY, supra note 25, § 2.01[2]) (emphasis added except as to the
word “this”); Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Int’l., Inc., 730 F.3d 494, 512 (6th
Cir. 2013) (stating that trademark law “incentivizes manufacturers to create robust brand
recognition by consistently offering good products and good services, which results in more
consumer satisfaction”); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 179 (2003); Osborn, supra note 14, at 582.
147. See McKenna, Normative Foundations, supra note 24, at 1896.
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Specifically, traditional trademark law viewed the property right as
a right to customer patronage, or put differently, the right derived from
the use of a trademark in connection with a business, and the property
was the goodwill. 148 Under this view of trademark law, digital file
creators and hosts do not trade on the goodwill associated with
trademarked tangible goods. Trading on this sort of goodwill would
require meaningful confusion. Consumers do not associate Ford’s
goodwill from its car business with the digital file because consumers
are not confused that they are buying a Ford car when they purchase a
digital model of the car. Even where the 3D printable file will print the
exact good sold (rather than a model), as long as consumers are not
confused as to the source of the file, customer patronage is not coopted.
In addition, the relevant incentive was to produce—that is, to
manufacture—high-quality goods. 149 Under this version of the producer
incentive theory, “3D printing will explode the dividing line between the
consumer protection and producer incentive rationales by giving
individuals the ability to print a remarkable range of fake trademarked
goods in the privacy of their own homes.” 150 In other words, where
production is decentralized and commoditized, consumers no longer
equate the quality of production with a trademark owner, unless the
consumer has special reason to believe that the mark owner actually
produced the particular item. 151 Thus, any sales of digital files will not
harm the mark owner’s incentive to manufacture quality tangible
goods. 152
148. Id. at 1884-86.
149. As to the emphasis on incentivizing quality production, see sources cited in note 146,
supra. See also Park N’ Fly Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 206 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“A mark must perform the function of distinguishing the producer . . . of a good . . . in
order to have any legitimate claim to protection.”) (emphasis added).
150. Osborn, supra note 14, at 583.
151. There is room under this theory to argue that trademark owners need incentive to produce
high-quality digital files. But courts should be careful to distinguish between the quality of files
versus the quality of the designs embodied in the files. The former might speak to whether the
object’s lines are drawn well and whether the 3D mesh is “water tight.” See, e.g., Jeff LaMarche,
Preparing
Blender
Files
for
3D
Printing,
SHAPEWAYS,
http://www.shapeways.com/tutorials/prepping_blender_files_for_3d_printing (last visited Feb. 7,
2017). The latter speaks to things outside of trademark law, as the next paragraph in the text
demonstrates. Even where there is need for good file quality, the trademark owner is only likely
harmed by third parties’ poor quality files if consumers believe the mark owner created or controls
the quality of the files. See Lemley & McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, supra note 30, at 174. But the
website’s context will usually make clear that another entity made the file. Mere sponsorship or
affiliation confusion, even if it exists, does not lead consumers to view the brand owner negatively.
Lemley & McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, supra note 103, at 436-39.
152. It might be argued that a trademark owner could lose incentive to produce quality goods
if it could not control 3D printable files that will print physical objects similar or identical to the
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Trademark law’s policy of incentivizing quality manufacturing will
look increasingly antiquated when manufacturing is largely not in the
hands of the trademark owner. The purchaser of the file controls the
manufacturing decision: she may print it at home or select any
commercial printing services provider. There may be a continued need
to incentivize quality design, which can be captured in a 3D printable
file, but utility patents, design patents, and to a lesser extent, copyrights
exist for just that purpose. 153 Applying trademark law to incentivize
product design generally, as opposed to protecting secondary meaning in
trade dress, would represent a wholesale policy change for trademark
law. Such a change would appear unnecessary in light of other IP
protection that is already available. 154 Moreover, the Constitution might
forbid such a focus, since the IP clause specifies that patents and
copyrights should incentivize utilitarian and creative design. 155
On the other hand, some modern courts and commentators argue
for a much different producer incentive focus, one that protects not
simply existing business, but brands in the abstract. 156 Under this view,
brand owners have a right to control virtually all uses of their
trademarks, seemingly regardless of meaningful confusion. This view of
producer protection yields a different doctrinal landscape, one that vastly
trademark owner’s where those printed objects are deceptively sold to the public. In this
circumstance, the doctrine of indirect trademark infringement offers the trademark owner
protection. See infra Section III.D.
153. Trade dress law can have an incidental effect on encouraging creative design because
trade dress law can exist for an item that is or was covered by a design patent. See Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000). But trade dress protection exists primarily to
prevent consumer confusion.
154. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989) (“The law
of unfair competition has its roots in the common-law tort of deceit: its general concern is with
protecting consumers from confusion as to source. While that concern may result in the creation of
‘quasi-property rights’ in communicative symbols, the focus is on the protection of consumers, not
the protection of producers as an incentive to product innovation.”) (emphasis added). There are
some quality design decisions that patent and copyright law will not protect, such as an incremental
but obvious utilitarian design improvement. But these exist in the realm of free competition and
may be freely copied, a decision the patent system makes intentionally. KSR Int’l v. Teleflex, Inc.,
550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007) (“And as progress beginning from higher levels of achievement is
expected in the normal course, the results of ordinary innovation are not the subject of exclusive
rights under the patent laws. Were it otherwise patents might stifle, rather than promote, the
progress of useful arts.”).
155. See supra notes 90-91, 93, and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional
dimensions of TrafFix).
156. See McKenna, Normative Foundations, supra note 24, at 1896 (“Modern trademark law,
by contrast, seeks to protect brands, construed broadly.”). Ironically, this expanded focus on brands
in the abstract began not by shifting to a property-centric view of trademark law, but shifting from a
natural rights property-centric view of trademark law and to a confusion emphasis unconstrained
from natural rights principles. Id.
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expands trademark rights.
C.

Socially Beneficial Activity

As one moves away from trademark law’s core prohibition against
deceitful copying, disagreement increases about the limits of the
incentive and confusion rationales. Many commentators have argued
that an incentive rationale does not support giving trademark owners the
maximum incentive to invest in quality goods (or a quality brand), but
only a socially optimal incentive. 157 And some expansions of trademark
law involve significant costs to society—including deadweight losses
and restriction on free expression—in exchange for likely minor extra
incentives to producers. 158 The Supreme Court’s trio of Dastar, TrafFix,
and Wal-Mart highlighted the social desirability of many forms of
copying, thus signaling a brake on trademark protection’s growth and
highlighting the distinction between imitation that deceives—which
trademark law is designed to prevent—and socially beneficial imitation.
Where neither consumers nor the public have generalized
expectations that manufactured products emanate from a specific source,
rather than from a 3D printer, denying non-confused consumers the
opportunity to obtain printable files and use them to manufacture their
own goods—even with another’s trademark included—creates
deadweight losses. 159 The non-confusing competition from 3D printable
files would lower prices for the “original” product, allowing more
consumers access to it. 160 This is even true for rote copying of products
157. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1031, 1046-69 (2005).
158. See, e.g., id. at 1059-69 (listing costs of IP rights, including deadweight losses, legislative
rent-seeking, enforcement costs, and diversion from other forms of production); Robert G. Bone,
Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547,
619 (2006) (noting costs of broad trademark rights, including deadweight loss, rent seeking costs,
and burdens on First Amendment values); Lunney, supra note 27, at 479-84 (discussing costs of
strong trademark protection and benefits of some forms of copying).
159. Cf. Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade
Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1170-73 (1948) (criticizing advertisements that create deadweight loss
based on irrational consumer attachment). These mid-twentieth century critiques fell out of favor
with the rise of law-and-economics responses questioning a hostile view of advertising. See, e.g.,
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. &
ECON. 265, 268-75 (1987) (contending that “the hostile view of brand advertising has been largely
and we think correctly rejected by economists”). But current views continue to recognize the
deadweight losses resulting from certain trademark protection. Lunney, supra note 27, at 479-81
(arguing against the myth that trademark protection cannot engender anticompetitive losses); Dogan
& Lemley, supra note 31, at 481-82 (arguing that a broad merchandising right increases costs
without a justifiable benefit).
160. If the original’s prices did not budge, that would suggest the “competition” is not
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down to the finest detail (including marks), which is sometimes frowned
upon as “free-riding.” But absent meaningful confusion, it is difficult to
condemn the copying as anything but healthy competition. 161
In many ways, 3D printing highlights refined versions of important
questions trademark law wrestled with in the first half of the twentieth
century:
[Broad trademark protection] enables one to acquire a vested interest in
a demand “spuriously” stimulated through “the art of advertising” by
“the power of reiterated suggestion” which creates stubborn habits.
This poses an important policy question: Should the courts actively
lend their aid to the making of profits derived from the building of
such habits, if and whenever those stubborn habits so dominate buyers
that they pay more for a product than for an equally good competing
product? 162

Though views toward advertising have softened since the mid-twentieth
century, 163 a similar question must be asked: Whether the law should
protect branded goods against competition from digital files where
consumers are generally not confused by the internal indicia of the file?
Beyond rote copying of a trademark owner’s products, 3D printing
will engender significant free expression, which trademark law might
stifle. Mature 3D printing technology will one day “allow a torrent of
creativity as users create 3D customizations, mash-ups, and parodies of
trademarked goods.” 164 For example, users can design and print a
handbag that is half Luis Vuitton and half Gucci or can create a
personalized version of a good bearing another’s trademark. Simple
examples of creative uses include the following “pumpkin” and
“pineapple” iPhone cases: 165
affecting the trademark owner.
161. See, e.g., Triangle Publ’ns, Inc., 167 F.2d 969, 978 (2d Cir. 1948) (Frank, J., dissenting)
(“[A] ‘free ride,’ without more, is in line with the theory of competition.”); Norwich Pharmacal Co.
v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569, 572 (2d Cir. 1959) (“Absent confusion, imitation of certain
successful features in another’s product is not unlawful and to that extent a ‘free ride’ is
permitted.”); Lunney, supra note 27, at 482-83.
162. Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Int’l., Inc., 730 F.3d 494, 512 (6th Cir.
2013) (“No harm is done to this incentive structure, however, by the copying of a product design
that does not confuse consumers as to the product’s source. . . . [T]rademark law, like the law of
unfair competition of which it is a part, focuses not on copying per se, but on confusion.”); Triangle
Publ’ns, Inc., 167 F.2d 969, 980 n.13 (2d Cir. 1948) (Frank, J., dissenting) (quoting Shredded
Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960 (2d Cir. 1918)).
163. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 158, at 602-03.
164. Osborn, supra note 14, at 585.
165. The pumpkin case was found at Case for iPhone 4 (Pumpkin), TURBOSQUID,
http://www.turbosquid.com/3d-models/3d-model-of-iphone-4-case/916181 (last visited Nov. 30,
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Using another’s trademark in an expressive work often pits First
Amendment values against the trademark owner’s private potential harm
to its mark or brand and the public’s interest in information
transmission. 166 Thus far, courts have engaged in balancing tests to
decipher whether a particular trademark use in an expressive work is
allowable. 167 The most popular test suggests, in a deceptively simple
fashion, that the Lanham Act “should be construed to apply to artistic
works only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion
outweighs the public interest in free expression.” 168 Applying the test is
easier said than done. But where the use of a symbol does not cause
significant confusion, as with many instances of 3D printing as
described above, the balance begins to tip in favor of protecting
expressive uses of marks, perhaps so much so that a bright-line rule is
justified.
Returning again to “rote” copying of another’s trademark-bearing
good, the issue of protected personal expression is further complicated
by the increasing recognition that consumers use brands to shape their
identity and express themselves. 169 A litany of commentators describe
2016), and the pineapple case was found at Case for iPhone 4 (Pumpkin), TURBOSQUID,
http://www.turbosquid.com/3d-models/3d-iphone-4-case/917065 (last visited Nov. 30, 2016).
166. See generally Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Policing the Border between Trademarks and
Free Speech: Protecting Unauthorized Trademark Use in Expressive Works, 80 WASH. L. REV. 887
(2005).
167. See, e.g., Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989); Regarding the
difficulties courts have with applying Rogers, see William K. Ford, Restoring Rogers: Video
Games, False Association Claims, and the “Explicitly Misleading” Use of Trademarks, 16 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 306 (2017).
168. Id.
169. E.g., Katya Assaf, Brand Fetishism, 43 CONN. L. REV. 83, 95 (2010) (“Several studies
confirm that consumers incorporate brands into their lives as tools for shaping and expressing their
own identities, and for perceiving the identities of others. Some brands even serve as objects of cults
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how, one way or another, strong trademark protections for certain goods
inhibit the free expression of individuals who would like to associate
with particular, usually expensive, brands. 170 Because status signaling is
an expressive act, it gives rise to First Amendment concerns. 171
Although an analysis of the First Amendment implications of selfexpressive trademark uses are beyond the scope of this Article,172 it is
uncontroversial to suggest the analysis is highly complex.
The upshot is that 3D printable files will often include creative and
expressive conduct that provides societal benefits and gives rise to First
Amendment issues. The current First Amendment framework involves
complex and indeterminate balancing tests that can cripple
unsophisticated individuals or startups. The costs of uncertainty recall
the Wal-Mart Court’s sensitivity to litigation costs as a deterrent to
beneficial activity, when it observed that “[c]ompetition is deterred,
however, not merely by successful suit but by the plausible threat of
successful suit, and given the unlikelihood of inherently sourceidentifying design, the game of allowing suit based upon alleged
inherent distinctiveness seems to us not worth the candle.” 173
By analogy, given the unlikelihood that a 3D printable file’s
and rituals . . . .”) (citations omitted); Barnett, supra note 128, at 1381-86; C. Scott Hemphill &
Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1176 (2009)
(noting a “snob effect” whereby “the prevalence of cheaper copies also may reduce demand for the
original design” because of “a consumer’s desire for distinction from lower-status consumers or
from other consumers more generally”); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Trademark Law and Status Signaling:
Tattoos for the Privileged, 59 FLA. L. REV. 195 (2007); Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin,
Counterfeit Goods, 29 J.L. & ECON. 211, 211 (1986) (“Many persons purchase branded goods for
the purpose of demonstrating to others that they are consumers of the particular good.”); H.
Leibenstein, Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers’ Demand, 64 Q.J.
ECON. 183, 189 (1950).
170. See, e.g., Assaf, supra note 169, at 122; Ann Bartow, Counterfeits, Copying and Class,
48 HOUS. L. REV. 707, 741-42 (2012) (arguing that trademark law is “contemptuous” of low income
consumers “who would like to purchase what appear to be authentic goods at deeply discounted
prices” even where there is no confusion as to authenticity, and, by so doing, “trademark law tries to
ensure that no one can legally possess the status of a brand they cannot afford); Barton Beebe,
Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 809 (2010); Michael
Grynberg, Trademark Litigation as Consumer Conflict, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 60, 87–94 (2008); Sheff,
supra note 130, at 803; Hemphill and Suk counter that there is “much more to fashion than status”
and that the lack of protections for fashion designers (other than copyright, design patent, and
trademark law) “push[es] creators toward the high-end realm of status and luxury, and away from
devoting creative resources to design innovation.” Hemphill & Suk, supra note 169, at 1179-80.
171. Sheff, supra note 130, at 804.
172. Others have provided such analysis. See Sheff, supra note 130, at 804-28; see also Robert
C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the
Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158 (1982); Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First
Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU L. REV. 381 (2008).
173. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 214 (2000).
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internal content suggests any meaningful source indication, a bright-line
rule can circumvent the current costly balancing tests. Dastar supplies
the bright-line rule for 3D printable files if we interpret its holding to
preclude analysis of a file’s internal content. 174 The resulting certainty
encourages more of what the Court deems socially beneficial activity.
While bright-line rules are less flexible than balancing tests, 175 the
certainty of a rule can outweigh the desirability of a more flexible
analysis. 176 Such a rule is likewise consonant with the TrafFix decision,
which was concerned that the harms to the patent law system from
overprotecting utilitarian design outweighed any benefit from rare
instances of consumer confusion. 177
It is important to recognize that a rule like Dastar’s does not leave
rights holders helpless with respect to printable files. First, trademark
owners have a clear trademark injury where a consumer is confused by
external indicia as to the source of the file, such as where a consumer is
deceived into believing she is downloading a file from the trademark
owner’s website. Second, any imprecision in the rule, and the resulting
possible injustice at the margins, is ameliorated by the potential
availability of other IP protection for some digital files. Just as the WalMart Court justified its bright-line rule—that product design cannot be
inherently distinctive—with reference to the producer’s ability to
“secur[e] a design patent or a copyright for the design,” 178 Dastar’s rule
is justified in part by the protections producers can receive for creative
works through copyright and design patents and for utilitarian works
through utility patents.
Finally, mark owners retain the ability to sue digital file creators
and distributors on the basis of indirect infringement. The next
subsection considers this doctrine and its application to printable files.

174. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003).
175. See, e.g., Osborn, supra note 48, at 421 (discussing the costs and benefits of rules and
standards).
176. Though the Court was not explicit in its calculus in Dastar, Wal-Mart demonstrates the
Court’s awareness that threats of litigation (and the costs thereof) can stifle creativity. See WalMart, 529 U.S. at 214; see also James Gibson, supra note 120, at 907-15. Recall that the Court
adopted a bright-line rule in Wal-Mart, deciding that product design cannot be inherently
distinctive. Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 214.
177. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U. S. 23, 29-30 (2001). Although
the issues with digital files are not as stark as in TrafFix, which dealt with the usurpation of explicit
patent policy. The concerns with digital files discussed herein would not lead to an extension of a
patent monopoly, because the seller of the file could simply remove the offending logo.
Nevertheless, the preservation of a robust domain of unfettered competition remains an important
concern.
178. Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 214.
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Indirect Infringement

If digital files do not directly infringe a trademark, trademark
owners can turn to the doctrine of indirect infringement to protect certain
rights. Under this doctrine, if a party “intentionally induces another to
infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom
it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement,
the manufacturer or distributor is contributorily responsible for any harm
done as a result of the deceit.” 179
A key requirement of indirect infringement is that there must be an
underlying act of direct infringement. 180 Of course, a non-confused
purchaser of a file would commit direct trademark infringement if she
printed copies of the tangible good bearing another’s trademark and sold
those goods while representing that they are from the trademark owner.
And if the seller of the file knew the buyer would engage in this activity,
trademark law’s core policy concerns are triggered and infringement
should be found.
But direct infringement will be lacking with many downstream
uses. If a non-confused transferee of a file merely keeps the file on his
home computer, there is no actionable confusion. Even where the
transferee uses the file to print a tangible good for purely personal use,
trademark law does not reach such personal uses because they are not
interstate in nature and are not trademark uses “in commerce.” 181
Indirect infringement also requires the distributor to have
knowledge that the downstream entity will engage in trademark
infringement. Sometimes that knowledge will be easy to prove, as where
a syndicate conspires to flood the market with counterfeit 3D printed

179. Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982).
180. Id.
181. Hunn v. Dan Wilson Homes, Inc., 789 F.3d 573, 588 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.
Ct. 592 (2015) (holding there can be no false designation of origin claim where plaintiff’s actions
(submitting allegedly misleading architectural plans to city) were entirely local and thus did not
meet the requirement “that the allegedly false designation enter into and/or have an effect on
interstate commerce”); Obolensky v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 628 F. Supp. 1552, 1556 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), aff’d, 795 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1986) (even assuming defendant publisher’s book catalogs
falsely indicated that plaintiff’s book had been published by defendant, there could be no liability
under § 43(a) where defendant did not publish or ship the book because the goods did not enter into
commerce); Cognotec Services, Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of New York, 862 F. Supp. 45
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“Cognotec has failed to allege that any of the infringing materials were
disseminated ‘in commerce.’ Indeed, the amended complaint makes clear that Morgan developed a
program to use internally for its currency customers. In other words, Morgan’s program is not
disseminated ‘in commerce’ as is required by a § 43(a) claim.”) (citation omitted); Osborn, supra
note 14, at 583, n.190.
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goods. But as in the patent context, 182 many file distributors, including
websites who host third-party content, will have little knowledge of what
the downstream users will do with the files and may lack expertise to
understand whether certain uses are infringing.
An important question—especially in the digital files context—is
whether the Supreme Court’s Inwood test applies to an intermediary who
merely facilitates other parties’ exchanges. The Supreme Court
articulated its Inwood test in a scenario where the defendant either
manufactured or distributed the goods directly. 183 In Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v.
eBay, Inc., 184 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided the
test applied to intermediaries where an intermediary has “more than a
general knowledge or reason to know that its service is being used to sell
counterfeit goods” and instead has “contemporary knowledge of”
specific acts that “are infringing or will infringe in the future.” 185 The
Court held that a defendant would satisfy the knowledge requirement if
it remained willfully blind to the infringement. 186
The Tiffany case holds important safeguards for many
intermediaries of digital files. It offers a safe harbor for intermediaries
who remove items that infringe or will infringe in the future. If a
trademark holder notifies the intermediary of an infringing item on its
website, the intermediary can avoid liability by removing the item.
Similarly, the intermediary can monitor its site to search for and remove
infringing items. In some cases, technology can assist in this process.
Yet, the Tiffany case has unclear boundaries and it may be difficult for
many intermediaries to bring themselves comfortably within the safe
harbor. For instance, the defendant in Tiffany, eBay, had immense
resources and devoted millions of dollars, sophisticated technology, and
considerable employee effort to policing infringement on its site.187

182. Timothy R. Holbrook & Lucas S. Osborn, Digital Patent Infringement in an Era of 3D
Printing, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1319, 1333-44 (2015) (outlining difficulties in successfully
capturing infringers based on an inducement theory).
183. Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
184. 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
185. Id. at 107. The defendant in eBay knew in general that some of its online listings were
counterfeit, but it removed any specific listings it knew were infringing. Because it never knowingly
allowed specific infringing acts to take place, it was not liable as a contributory infringer. Several
courts have followed this analysis. See, e.g., Spy Phone Labs LLC v. Google Inc., No. 15-cv3756, 2016 WL 6025469 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2016); Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 730 F. Supp.
2d 531 (E.D. Va. 2010).
186. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 109-10.
187. Id. at 97-100 (detailing, inter alia, eBay’s $20 million per year and 4,000 employees
devoted to promote trust and safety on its website, including 200 employees devoted exclusively on
combating infringement).
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Smaller intermediaries could not hope to match eBay’s efforts and
sophistication, and it is not clear whether courts will use a sliding scale
based on an intermediary’s resources.
Indirect infringement will be an important tool to stop those who
intentionally facilitate confusion using 3D printing technology. At the
same time, courts should not apply it with too heavy a hand when a web
intermediary is acting in good faith, but lacks resources for a
sophisticated policing paradigm. Otherwise, intermediaries will opt to
shut down or severely curtail their operations rather than face liability
for unintentional missteps. In that case, society loses the benefit of all
the non-infringing activity the intermediary forebears because of liability
fears.
IV. CONCLUSION
The digital world does not require a wholesale makeover of our IP
laws. But it does require careful attention to legal policy as applied to
technological change. 3D printing separates design from manufacturing.
The technology drastically reconfigures how people interact with brands
and how they understand design and manufacturing. The contours of a
world with mature 3D printing are uncertain, and trademark law should
not be used to stifle the technological possibilities. 188 Rather than
stretching already tenuous doctrines to smother a nascent technology,
courts should apply trademark law to situations where consumers are
meaningfully confused and brand owners’ incentives to invest in quality
goods are materially dampened.

188.

Osborn, supra note 14, at 556-57.
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